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Abstract
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contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the firm can limit the manager's informational rents with the
early termination of the project. In this setting, we find that the firm optimally commits to a capital allocation
scheme whereby it forgoes positive net present value (NPV) projects at Stage 1 (capital rationing), whereas at
Stage 2, depending on the manager's previous report, it sometimes implements projects with a negative
continuation NPV but in other situations forgoes implementing projects with positive continuation NPVs.
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Capital	  budgeting	  frequently	   involves	  multiple	  stages	  at	  which	  firms	  can	  continue	  or	  abandon	  ongoing	  
projects.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  study	  a	  project	  requiring	  two	  stages	  of	  investment.	  Failure	  to	  fund	  Stage	  1	  of	  
the	  investment	  precludes	  investment	  in	  Stage	  2,	  whereas	  failure	  to	  fund	  Stage	  2	  results	  in	  early	  termina-­‐
tion.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  existing	  literature,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  firm	  can	  limit	  the	  manager’s	  informational	  
rents	  with	  the	  early	  termination	  of	  the	  project.	  In	  this	  setting,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  firm	  optimally	  commits	  to	  
a	   capital	   allocation	   scheme	   whereby	   it	   foregoes	   positive	   NPV	   projects	   at	   Stage	   1	   (capital	   rationing),	  
while	  at	  Stage	  2,	  depending	  on	  the	  manager’s	  previous	  report,	  it	  sometimes	  implements	  projects	  with	  a	  
negative	  continuation	  NPV	  but	  in	  other	  situations	  foregoes	  implementing	  projects	  with	  positive	  continu-­‐
ation	  NPVs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  University	  of	  Bocconi	  
†	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  
‡	  UCLA	  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097939
I. Introduction	  
In	  the	  presence	  of	  privately-­‐informed	  managers,	  a	  firm’s	  capital	  budgeting	  policies	  balance	  investment	  
efficiency	  against	   informational	  rents,	  or	  slack,	  such	  as	  managers’	  consumption	  of	  perquisites.	  To	   limit	  
the	  opportunities	  for	  managers	  to	  divert	  capital	  funds	  for	  private	  benefit,	  firms	  use	  their	  managerial	  ac-­‐
counting	  systems	  as	  well	  as	  audits	  of	   their	  capital	  projects.	  For	  example,	   these	  systems	  can	  easily	  un-­‐
cover,	  and	  thereby	  preclude,	  the	  manager’s	  diversion	  of	  capital	  funds	  from	  appropriate	  investments	  to	  
private	  uses	  such	  as	  vacations	  or	  excess	  compensation.	  However,	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  for	  these	  systems	  to	  
distinguish	  between	  investments	  in	  necessary	  and	  unnecessary	  assets,	  provided	  that	  both	  fall	  within	  the	  
general	  class	  of	  appropriate	  purchases.	  For	  instance,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  detect	  that	  a	  manager	  is	  en-­‐
gaging	  in	  empire	  building	  (acquiring	  unnecessary	  hard	  assets	  such	  as	  research	  equipment,	  cars,	  or	  offic-­‐
es;	  or	  unnecessary	  soft	  assets	  such	  as	  staff	  and	  consulting	  services)	  from	  which	  he	  derives	  private	  bene-­‐
fits.	   Thus,	  at	  best	   the	   firm’s	  accounting	  and	  auditing	   systems	  may	  mitigate	  a	  manager’s	   informational	  
rent	  by	  constraining	  the	  set	  of	  assets	  into	  which	  he	  can	  divert	  capital	  funds	  for	  private	  benefit.	  One	  pos-­‐
sible	  implication	  of	  restricting	  investment	  to	  specific	  asset	  classes	  is	  that	  the	  private	  benefit	  provided	  to	  
the	  manager	  can	  be	  consumed	  over	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  private	  benefit	  of	  lavish	  offices	  is	  consumed	  
over	  the	  time	  that	  the	  manager	  actually	  uses	  these	  offices	  (as	  compared	  to	  excess	  compensation	  or	  va-­‐
cations	  whose	  benefits	  are	  consumed	  immediately).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  constraining	  a	  manager’s	  asset	  diver-­‐
sions,	  a	  principal	  can	  deny	  the	  manager	  the	  full	  consumption	  of	  such	  private	  benefits	  by	  abandoning	  the	  
project	  before	  completion.	  However,	  by	  abandoning	  the	  project,	  the	  principal	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  fully	  re-­‐
coup	  her	   initial	   investment.	  We	  study	  the	   implications	  of	  this	  abandonment	  option	  and	  “delayed	  slack	  
consumption”	  on	  optimal	  capital	  allocation	  schemes.	  	  
We	  consider	  a	  multi-­‐stage	  capital	  budgeting	  setting	  in	  which	  a	  privately-­‐informed	  manager	  proposes	  an	  
initial	  research	  budget	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  project	  that	  the	  principal	  either	  accepts	  or	  rejects.	  If	  the	  princi-­‐
pal	  accepts,	  the	  funds	  are	  made	  available	  to	  the	  manager	  who	  engages	  in	  the	  research	  required	  to	  dis-­‐
cover	  the	  feasibility	  and	  net	  benefit	  of	  implementing	  the	  project	  of	  interest.	  If	  the	  research	  stage	  is	  suc-­‐
cessful,	  the	  continuation	  value	  of	  the	  project	  becomes	  known	  to	  both	  the	  principal	  and	  manager	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  Stage	  1.	  The	  principal	  determines	  whether	  to	  implement	  or	  abandon	  the	  project	  in	  Stage	  2.	  Con-­‐
sistent	  with	  the	  above	  discussion,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  manager	  cannot	  consume	  all	  the	  slack	  in	  Stage	  1	  
that	  may	  arise	  from	  the	  investment.	  As	  a	  result,	  if	  the	  project	  is	  abandoned	  at	  Stage	  2	  the	  manager	  fore-­‐
goes	   consuming	   some	   of	   the	   associated	   informational	   rent.	   Likewise,	   if	   the	   project	   is	   abandoned	   at	  
Stage	  2,	  the	  principal	  cannot	  fully	  recoup	  her	  initial	  investment.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  investment	  is	  abandoned,	  a	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deadweight	   loss	   is	   incurred.	   For	   simplicity,	   and	   without	   loss	   of	   generality,	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   early	  
abandonment	  of	  the	  project	  leads	  to	  the	  manager	  consuming	  no	  slack	  and	  the	  principal	  receiving	  a	  zero	  
salvage	  value	  for	  his	  Stage	  1	  investment.	  
Our	  model	   of	   “delayed	   slack	   consumption”	   gives	   rise	   to	   an	   optimal	   capital	   allocation	   scheme	   that	   is	  
qualitatively	  different	  from	  that	  found	  in	  the	  previous	  literature	  but	  is	  consistent	  with	  empirical	  findings.	  
For	  example,	  we	  find	  that	  while	  the	  optimal	  capital	  allocation	  scheme	  uses	  a	  single	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  rate	  
that	  results	  in	  under-­‐investment	  or	  capital	  rationing	  at	  Stage	  1	  (the	  research	  stage),	  at	  Stage	  2	  it	  applies	  
different	  hurdle	  rates	  depending	  on	  the	  manager’s	  previous	  Stage	  1	  cost	  report	  and	  the	  outcome	  of	  his	  
Stage	  1	  research.	  In	  fact,	  we	  find	  that	  it	  is	  optimal	  for	  the	  principal	  to	  commit	  to	  continue	  some	  projects	  
at	  Stage	  2	  even	  if	  they	  have	  a	  negative	  continuation	  value	  (i.e.,	  Stage	  2	  over-­‐investment),	  while	  it	  is	  also	  
optimal	  to	  commit	  to	  forego	  other	  projects	  that	  have	  a	  positive	  continuation	  value	  (i.e.,	  Stage	  2	  under-­‐
investment).	  Our	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  both	  over	  and	  under-­‐investment	  
across	  firms	  found	  by	  Richardson	  (2006)	  and	  Driver	  and	  Temple	  (2009).	  However,	  our	  results	  are	  most	  
closely	   related	   to	  Poterba	  and	  Summers	   (1995)	  who	   find	  multiple	  hurdle	   rates	  within	   individual	   firms,	  
some	  of	  which	  are	  below	  and	  some	  of	  which	  are	  above	  their	  cost	  of	  capital.	  	  
While	  our	  model	  is	  descriptive	  of	  a	  large	  class	  of	  capital	  budgeting	  problems,	  we	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  partic-­‐
ularly	  descriptive	  of	   the	  capital	  budgeting	  process	   for	  R&D	  projects	   that	   tend	   to	  span	  multiple	  stages;	  
require	  highly-­‐specialized	  investments	  whose	  salvage	  values,	  if	  abandoned	  early,	  are	  significantly	  lower	  
than	  their	  initial	  costs;	  and	  for	  which	  the	  general	  categories	  of	  assets	  to	  be	  funded	  can	  be	  agreed	  upon	  
ahead	  of	  time	  and	  audited.	  For	  example,	  R&D	  investments	  often	  require	  multiple	  investment	  stages	  be-­‐
cause	   additional	   technological	   information	   (regarding	   cost,	   reliability	   and	   scalability)	   or	  market	   infor-­‐
mation	  (regarding	  availability	  of	  suppliers	  or	  demand)	  can	  only	  be	  acquired	  after	  constructing	  a	  proto-­‐
type	  plant	  or	  product.1	  Another	  applicable	  R&D	  setting	  is	  one	  where	  regulatory	  obligations	  must	  be	  sat-­‐
isfied	  sequentially;	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  newly	  developed	  drugs	  undergoing	  FDA	  approval.	  
II. Literature	  Review 
Our	   paper	   builds	   on	   the	   single-­‐period,	   adverse	   selection	   capital	   budgeting	  model	   of	   Antle	   and	   Eppen	  
(1985)	   in	  which	   the	  project	  cost	   is	  commonly	  known,	  but	   the	   rate	  of	   return	   is	  privately	  known	  by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  multi-­‐stage	  capital	  budgeting,	  see	  Gompers	  (1995)	  and	  Gitman	  and	  Mercurio	  (1982).	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manager.	  Because	  the	  manager	  can	  immediately	  consume	  any	  allocated	  funds	  above	  and	  beyond	  those	  
required	  for	  the	  project,	  his	  incentive	  is	  always	  to	  understate	  the	  project’s	  true	  rate	  of	  return.	  To	  miti-­‐
gate	   the	  manager’s	  misreporting	   incentives,	   the	   optimal	   capital	   allocation	   scheme	  provides	   the	   same	  
budget	   for	   all	   projects	   and	   specifies	   a	   single	   required	   rate	   of	   return	   or	   hurdle	   rate	   that	   exceeds	   the	  
firm’s	  cost	  of	  capital,	  causing	  the	  firm	  to	  forego	  some	  positive	  NPV	  projects	  (i.e.,	  under-­‐invest).2	  	  
Antle	  and	  Fellingham	  (1990),	  Fellingham	  and	  Young	  (1990)	  and	  Arya	  et	  al.	  (1994)	  extend	  the	  model	  to	  a	  
repeated	  game,	  where	   the	  manager	  privately	  observes	  and	  reports	  on	  a	  new	  and	   independent	   invest-­‐
ment	  opportunity	  in	  each	  period.	  Similarly,	  Antle	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  considers	  the	  value	  of	  giving	  the	  privately-­‐
informed	  manager	  an	  option	  to	  postpone	  the	  investment	  to	  a	  later	  period	  at	  which	  time	  he	  may	  discov-­‐
er	  and	  report	  on	  a	  new	  and	  unrelated	  investment	  opportunity.	  In	  contrast,	  we	  consider	  projects	  where	  
the	  Stage	  2	   investment	  opportunity	  only	  arises	   if	   the	   firm	   invested	   in	  Stage	  1;	   i.e.,	   the	   former	   can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	   latter.	  Furthermore,	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	   literature	  assumes	  that	  the	  
manager	   can	   immediately	   consume	  any	   slack	  provided	  by	   the	  principal,	  whereas	  we	  assume	   that	   the	  
manager	  consumes	  the	  slack	  across	  multiple	  stages.	  
Most	  closely	  related	  to	  our	  work	   is	  the	  abandonment	  options	   literature.	  Levitt	  and	  Snyder	  (1997)	  con-­‐
siders	  a	  two-­‐stage	  setting	  where	  the	  manager	  is	  subject	  to	  moral	  hazard	  in	  Stage	  1,	  and	  his	  efforts	  affect	  
both	  an	  interim	  signal	  received	  between	  the	  two	  stages,	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  project	  succeeding	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  Stage	  2.3	   If	   the	  principal	  abandons	  the	  project	  upon	  receiving	  the	   interim	  signal,	   she	  elimi-­‐
nates	  the	  possibility	  of	  conditioning	  the	  manager’s	  compensation	  on	  the	  project	  outcome,	  thereby	  ex-­‐
acerbating	  the	  Stage	  1	  moral	  hazard	  problem.	  Consequently,	  the	  principal	  optimally	  continues	  projects	  
with	  a	  negative	  continuation	  value	  (over-­‐invests)	  when	  the	  Stage	  1	  moral	  hazard	  problem	  is	  sufficiently	  
severe.4	  Unlike	  Levitt	  and	  Snyder	  (1997),	  we	  find	  instances	  of	  both	  under-­‐	  and	  over-­‐investment.	  Further,	  
because	  the	  manager	  in	  our	  model	  takes	  no	  productive	  actions	  but	  has	  private	  information,	  the	  principal	  
uses	  her	  Stage	  2	  abandonment/continuation	  decision	  to	  control	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  reporting	  incen-­‐
tives.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Bockem	  and	  Schiller	  (2009)	  finds	  report	  contingent	  budgets	  which	  are	  used	  to	  motivate	  the	  manager	  to	  engage	  in	  
costly	  information	  gathering.	  A	  similar	  extension	  is	  considered	  in	  Kim	  (2006).	  
3	  We	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  referring	  us	  to	  Levitt	  and	  Snyder	  (1997).	  
4	  Dutta	  and	  Fan	  (2009)	  and	  Bernardo	  et	  al	  (2009)	  also	  study	  moral	  hazard	  models	  which	  give	  rise	  to	  instances	  of	  
over-­‐investment.	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The	  structure	  of	  our	  model	  is	  most	  closely	  related	  to	  that	  of	  Pfeiffer	  and	  Schneider	  (2007).	  In	  both	  pa-­‐
pers,	  the	  principal	  makes	  a	  Stage	  1	  investment	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  manager’s	  report	  and	  later	  makes	  
her	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  decision	  based	  on	  information	  revealed	  at	  Stage	  2.5	  The	  major	  difference	  be-­‐
tween	   our	   paper	   and	   Pfeiffer	   and	   Schneider	   (2007)	   concerns	   the	   informational	   rent.	   In	   Pfeiffer	   and	  
Schneider	   (2007)	   the	  principal	   incurs	  an	   informational	   rent	   (and	   the	  manager	  consumes	   it)	  only	   if	   the	  
project	  is	  continued.6	  In	  our	  model,	  the	  principal	  incurs	  the	  informational	  rent	  upfront	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
Stage	  1	  funding.	   If	   the	  project	   is	  not	  continued,	  there	   is	  a	  deadweight	   loss	   in	  that	  the	  principal	  has	  al-­‐
ready	  incurred	  the	  informational	  rent	  but	  the	  manager	  cannot	  consume	  it.	  
Our	  finding	  of	  Stage	  2	  over-­‐investment	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  “escalation	  errors”	  (Staw	  1976	  
and	  Berg	  et	  al.	  2009).	  This	  literature	  identifies	  settings	  in	  which	  a	  person	  who	  has	  previously	  invested	  in	  
a	  project	  subsequently	  finds	  out	  that	  the	  continuation	  value	  of	  the	  project	  is	  negative	  but	  still	  chooses	  
not	  to	  abandon	  it,	  resulting	   in	  over-­‐investment.	  Kanodia	  et	  al.	   (1989)	  provides	  a	  rational	  economic	  ex-­‐
planation	   for	   such	   behavior	   based	   on	   reputational	   concerns.	   In	   that	   model,	   abandoning	   the	   project	  
would	  indicate	  that	  the	  person	  did	  not	  have	  “foresight”	  at	  the	  time	  he	  initially	   invested	  in	  the	  project,	  
causing	  the	   labor	  market	  to	  revise	  downward	  his	  value	  and	  future	  outside	  opportunity	  wage.	  The	  pre-­‐
sent	  paper	  and	  Kanodia	  et	  al.	  (1989)	  explain	  two	  very	  different	  over-­‐investment	  phenomena.	  Kanodia	  et	  
al.	  (1989)	  examines	  a	  single	  actor	  –	  labor	  market	  setting	  in	  which	  it	  is	  optimal	  for	  the	  single	  actor	  to	  con-­‐
tinue	  a	  negative	  NPV	  project.	  The	  present	  paper	  examines	  an	  optimal	  contracting,	  principal-­‐agent	  set-­‐
ting,	  in	  which	  it	  is	  optimal	  for	  the	  principal	  to	  commit	  to	  continue	  a	  negative	  NPV	  project	  in	  order	  to	  mit-­‐
igate	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  reporting	  incentives.	  	  
III. Model 
We	   study	   an	   adverse	   selection	  model	   encompassing	   two	   stages.	   At	   Stage	   1,	   the	  manager	   requests	   a	  
budget	  to	   investigate	  a	  potential	  new	  project.	  The	  cost	  required	  to	  successfully	  conduct	  this	   investiga-­‐
tion	  is	  privately	  known	  by	  the	  manager.	  If	  funded,	  the	  manager’s	  investigative	  or	  research	  work	  gener-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  interim	  signal	  is	  privately	  observed	  by	  the	  manager	  in	  Pfeiffer	  and	  Schneider	  (2007),	  whereas	  it	  is	  publicly	  ob-­‐
served	  in	  our	  model.	  
6	  Further,	  in	  Pfeiffer	  and	  Schneider	  (2007)	  the	  abandonment	  decision	  creates	  information	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  al-­‐
lows	  the	  principal	  to	  perfectly	  observe	  the	  agent’s	  subsequent	  effort	  choice.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Arya	  and	  Glover	  (2003)	  
abandonment	  destroys	  information	  about	  the	  agent’s	  prior	  choice	  of	  effort.	  In	  our	  model,	  the	  Stage	  2	  decision	  has	  
no	  effect	  on	  the	  information	  available	  to	  the	  principal.	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ates	  a	  public	  signal	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Stage	  1,	  that	  reveals	  the	  continuation	  value	  of	  implementing	  the	  pro-­‐
ject.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  Stage	  2,	  after	  the	  public	  signal	  is	  revealed,	  the	  principal	  decides	  whether	  to	  abandon	  
or	  to	  implement	  the	  project.	  We	  label	  Stage	  1	  the	  research	  stage	  and	  Stage	  2	  the	  implementation	  stage,	  
as	  the	  project	  is	  assumed	  to	  end	  without	  any	  payoff	  in	  Stage	  2	  unless	  the	  principal	  makes	  the	  Stage	  2	  in-­‐
vestment	  to	  implement	  the	  project.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  two	  stages,	  we	  refer	  to	  an	  investment	  in	  Stage	  1	  
as	  “funding”	  research	  and	  an	  investment	  in	  Stage	  2	  as	  “implementing”	  the	  project.	  
The	  timeline	  is	  as	  follows	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  At	  time	  t=1	  a	  risk-­‐neutral	  firm	  (the	  principal)	  hires	  a	  risk-­‐neutral	  
manager	  to	  oversee	  the	  research	  activity	  associated	  with	  a	  potential	  new	  project.	  The	  principal	  offers	  a	  
contract	   to	   the	  manager	   that	   fully	   specifies	   the	  compensation	   scheme	  and	  capital	  budgeting	   rules	   (as	  
discussed	  below).	  At	   t=0,	  prior	   to	  being	  hired,	   the	  manager	  privately	  observes	   the	   level	  of	   funding	  re-­‐
quired	  to	  conduct	  the	  research	  in	  Stage	  1.	  We	  assume	  that	  the	  research	  stage	  requires	  a	  minimum	  in-­‐
vestment	  of	   { }1,...,i nc C c c∈ = ,	  where	   1i ic c i+< ∀ ,	  is	  privately	  observed	  by	  the	  manager.	  Any	  Stage	  1	  in-­‐
vestment	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  observed	   ic 	  generates	  a	  contractible	  signal,	   { }1,...,j kg G g g∈ = ,	  
where	   1j jg g j+> ∀ ,	  which	  denotes	  the	  net	  continuation	  value	  of	   implementing	  the	  project	  at	  t=4.
7	  To	  
highlight	  the	  role	  of	  the	  abandonment	  decision	  and	  delayed	  slack	  consumption	  in	  mitigating	  inefficien-­‐
cies,	  we	  assume	  that	  at	  time	  t=1,	  the	  principal	  can	  commit	  to	  a	  t=4	  implementation	  schedule	  based	  on	  
the	  contractible	  continuation	  signal,	   jg .	  The	  interim	  signal	  being	  contractible	  allows	  us	  to	  ignore	  addi-­‐
tional	  issues	  that	  arise	  when	  information	  asymmetry	  occurs	  at	  two	  different	  points	  in	  time.	  Without	  loss	  
of	  generality,	  any	  Stage	  1	  investment	  less	  than	  the	  observed	   ic 	  will	  cause	  the	  research	  stage	  to	  fail	  with	  
certainty,	  which	  we	  assume	  to	  be	  a	  contractible	  event.	  The	  probability	  densities	  of	  ci	  and	  gj	  are	  common	  
knowledge,	   independent	  and	  represented	  by	   ( )if c 	  and	   ( )j jf g ρ≡ 	   respectively.8	  To	  facilitate	  the	  ex-­‐
position,	  we	  assume	  that	   the	  discrete	  costs,	   ic ,	  are	  evenly	  spaced,	  with	   1i ic c δ−− = 	   for	   1i > ,	   1c δ= ,	  
and	   that	   these	  costs	  are	  uniformly	  distributed:	   ( ) 1nif c = .	  The	  assumptions	  placed	  on	   the	  probability	  
distributions	  of	  the	  Stage	  1	  costs	  and	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  values	  significantly	  simplify	  the	  characteriza-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  ordering	  of	  ci’s	  and	  gj’s	  implies	  that	  the	  principal	  prefers	  smaller	  indices	  for	  both	  ci	  and	  gj.	  
8	  The	  model	  could	  also	  accommodate	  correlated	  random	  variables,	   c and	  g,	  although	  doing	  so	  would	  complicate	  
the	  interpretation	  of	  our	  results,	  as	  one	  would	  then	  have	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  effects	  caused	  by	  statistical	  
dependence	  versus	  those	  arising	  from	  the	  delayed	  consumption	  of	  slack.	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tion	  of	  the	  manager’s	  informational	  rent.	  However,	  we	  believe	  that	  all	  qualitative	  results	  would	  continue	  
to	  hold	  with	  more	  general	  distributions.	  
We	  next	  specify	  the	  budgeting	  and	  compensation	  processes.	  At	  time	  t=2,	  the	  manager	  uses	  his	  private	  
information	  to	  submit	  a	  report,	   ˆic ,	  to	  the	  principal	  regarding	  his	  research	  costs	  and	  the	  latter	  funds	  the	  
project	   according	   to	   the	   contract	   agreed	   to	   at	   time	   t=1:	  with	   probability	   ( ) [ ]ˆ 0,1iz c ∈ 	   the	   research	   is	  
funded	  and	  with	  probability	   ( )ˆ1 iz c− 	  it	  is	  not.	  If	  the	  project	  is	  not	  funded,	  the	  game	  ends	  and	  both	  par-­‐
ties	  receive	  their	  reservation	  utility	  of	  zero.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  project	  is	  funded,	  the	  manager	  re-­‐
ceives	  the	  contractually-­‐specified	  budget	  of	   ( )iˆb c 	  to	  fund	  his	  research	  at	  t=3.	  We	  assume	  that	  the	  man-­‐
ager’s	  spending	  is	  imperfectly	  audited,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  so	  that	  he	  cannot	   immediately	  
divert	   any	   funds	   in	   excess	   of	   that	   required	   to	   conduct	   the	   Stage	  1	   research	   (i.e.,	   ( )iˆ ib c c− )	   into	   con-­‐
sumption.	  Hence,	  the	  manager	  invests	  his	  entire	  budget	  in	  research-­‐related	  assets;	  however,	  only	   ic 	  is	  
necessary	  to	  conduct	  the	  Stage	  1	  research.	  The	  remainder	  generates	  no	  benefit	  to	  the	  firm	  but	  provides	  
the	  manager	  with	  personal	  utility	  in	  Stage	  2	  –	  so	  long	  as	  the	  project	  is	  implemented.9	  The	  principal’s	  im-­‐
plementation	  decision	   at	   t=4	   accords	  with	   the	   contract	   agreed	   to	   at	   t=1:	   she	   implements	   the	   project	  
with	  probability	   ( ) [ ]ˆ , 0,1i jp c g ∈ ,	  and	  abandons	  it	  with	  probability	   ( )ˆ1 ,i jp c g− .	  We	  assume	  that	  if	  the	  
project	  is	  abandoned	  at	  t=4,	  the	  principal	  cannot	  recoup	  the	  earlier	  investment,	   ib .	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
if	   the	  project	   is	   implemented	  at	   t=4,	   then	  at	   t=5,	   the	  principal	   consumes	   the	   residual	  project	   surplus,	  
( )ˆj ig b c− ,	  and	  the	  manager	  consumes	  the	  excess	  funding,	  or	  slack,	  procured	  in	  Stage	  1:	   ( )iˆ ib c c− .	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Bolton	  and	  Dewatripont	  (1994)	  make	  a	  similar	  assumption.	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Figure	  1:	  Two-­‐stage	  timeline.	  
As	  a	  managerial	  example	  of	  our	  setting,	  consider	  a	  firm	  that	  is	  interested	  in	  entering	  a	  new	  geographical	  
market	  with	  uncertain	  market	  potential.	  The	   firm	  decides	   to	  delay	   the	   large	  upfront	  costs	   required	   to	  
fully	  enter	  the	  market	  by	  hiring	  a	  manager	  to	  conduct	  a	  trial	  experiment	  in	  a	  representative	  fraction	  of	  
the	  market.	  To	  do	  so,	  the	  manager	  needs	  to	  hire	  people	  familiar	  with	  the	  new	  market	  and	  invest	  in	  facil-­‐
ities.	  The	  manager	  is	  privately	  informed	  as	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  running	  the	  trial.	  While	  the	  firm	  can	  audit	  the	  
manager’s	  spending,	   it	  cannot	  distinguish	  between	  necessary	  and	  excessive	  investments	  in	  people	  and	  
facilities.	  The	  manager	  can	  only	  consume	  the	  full	  private	  benefits	  provided	  by	  excess	  Stage	  1	  funding	  if	  
the	  trial	  is	  successful	  and	  the	  firm	  decides	  to	  fully	  enter	  the	  market.	  Again,	  if	  the	  project	  is	  abandoned,	  
the	  salvage	  value	  of	  the	  unconsumed	  assets	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  zero.	  
Although	  we	   have	   outlined	   an	   extensive	   list	   of	   assumptions	   above,	   the	   three	   critical	   assumptions	   re-­‐
quired	  for	  our	  results	  are:	   (1)	  the	  manager	  does	  not	  consume	  all	   the	  slack	   in	  Stage	  1;	   (2)	  the	  principal	  
cannot	   recoup	   all	   of	   the	   unconsumed	   funding	   if	   the	   project	   is	   abandoned;	   and	   (3)	   the	   principal	   and	  
manager	  cannot	  contract	  on	   the	  price	  of	   salvaged	  assets	   if	   the	  project	   is	  abandoned.	  Assumptions	   (1)	  
and	   (2)	   guarantee	   that	  a	  deadweight	   loss	   is	   incurred	   if	   the	  project	   is	   abandoned,	  whereas	   (3)	  assures	  
that	  the	  principal	  cannot	  fully	  resolve	  the	  Stage	  1	  adverse	  selection	  problem	  by	  abandoning	  the	  project	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IV. Two	  Benchmark	  Models 
Before	  formally	  stating	  our	  problem,	  we	  introduce	  two	  benchmark	  models	  that	  will	  help	  us	  analyze	  the	  
efficiency	  implications	  of	  our	  model	  (referred	  to	  as	  the	  Commitment	  model).	  The	  First-­‐Best	  (FB)	  model	  
is	  identical	  to	  the	  Commitment	  model,	  but	  without	  adverse	  selection;	  that	  is,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  man-­‐
ager’s	  research	  cost,	   ic ,	   is	  common	  knowledge.	  Accordingly,	  the	  principal	  provides	  a	  budget	  of	   i ib c= .	  
Let	   FBhc 	  be	  the	  largest	  research	  cost	  realization	  that	  the	  principal	  agrees	  to	  fund,	  i.e.	   [ ]FB jhc E g≤ 	  and	  
1 [ ]FB jhc E g+ > .	  At	  Stage	  2,	  the	  principal	  optimally	  implements	  all	  projects	  with	  positive	  continuation	  val-­‐
ues;	  i.e.,	  a	  project	  is	  implemented	  if	  and	  only	  if	   0jg ≥ ,	  regardless	  of	  the	  (sunk)	  Stage	  1	  expenditures.	  As	  
with	  the	  definition	  of	   FBhc ,	  let	  
FBw 	  be	  the	  continuation	  value	  index	  such	  that	   0FBwg ≥ 	  but	   1 0.FBwg + < 	  
Comparing	   the	   results	   from	   the	   Commitment	   and	   First-­‐Best	   models	   will	   allow	   us	   to	   identify	   over-­‐
investment,	  under-­‐investment,	  and	  the	  agency	  costs	  associated	  with	  eliciting	  the	  manager’s	  private	  in-­‐
formation.	  We	  define	  under-­‐investment	  at	  Stage	  1	  relative	  to	  First-­‐Best	  as	  any	  allocation	  policy	  where	  
profitable	  projects	  are	  not	  funded,	  i.e.,	   1iz < 	  for	  some	   ˆ FBi hc c≤ 	  .	  We	  define	  under-­‐investment	  at	  Stage	  2	  
if	  some	  projects	  with	  a	  positive	  continuation	  value	  are	  abandoned,	  i.e.,	   ( )ˆ , 1i jp c g < 	  for	  some FBj wg g≥ 	  	  
and	   i .	  Over-­‐investment	  is	  similarly	  defined.	  
To	  illustrate	  how	  our	  results	  differ	  from	  prior	  capital	  budgeting	  research,	  we	  introduce	  a	  second	  bench-­‐
mark:	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	   (NC)	  model	   is	   identical	  to	  our	  Commitment	  model	  (including	  delayed	  slack	  
consumption),	  but	  where	  the	  principal	  cannot	   commit	   to	  her	  Stage	  2	   implementation	  rule	  at	   the	  con-­‐
tracting	  period,	   t=1.	   Instead,	   the	  principal	   follows	  a	   sequentially	   rational	   Stage	  2	   implementation	   rule	  
that	   implements	  all	  projects	  with	  non-­‐negative	  continuation	  values	  ( 0jg ≥ ),	  regardless	  of	  the	  Stage	  1	  
expenditure.	  Therefore	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  solution	  has	  the	  same	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  policy	  as	  the	  
First-­‐Best	   solution,	   i.e.,	   0NC FBw wg g= ≥ .	   Because	   the	   principal	   cannot	   commit	   to	   an	   implementation	  
rule	  when	  she	  proposes	  a	   contract	   in	   the	  No-­‐Commitment	   setting,	  her	  only	  available	  controls	  are	   the	  
probability	  of	  providing	  a	  budget,	   ( )iˆz c 	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  allocated	  budget,	   ( )iˆb c .	  However,	  because	  
the	  sequentially	  rational	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rule	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  cost	  re-­‐
port,	   we	   can	   still	   invoke	   the	   Revelation	   Principle,	   which	   implies	   iˆ ic c= .	   To	   simplify	   what	   follows,	   let	  
( )i iz z c≡ ,	   ( )i ib b c≡ ,	   and	   ( ), ,i j i jp p c g≡ .	   The	   optimal	   solution	   to	   the	   No-­‐Commitment	  model	   thus	  
solves:	  
Multi-­‐stage	  Capital	  Budgeting	  with	  Delayed	  Consumption	  of	  Slack	   Page	  9	  of	  30	  
,
1
,, , 1 1
max
i i i j
n k
P i j i j j inb z p i j
U z p g bρ
= =
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ 	  
subject	  to:	  




i j i j i i s j s j s i
j j
z p b c z p b c i s nρ ρ
= =
− ≥ − =∑ ∑ K 	   	   (TTNC)	  
( ),
1
0 1, , .
k
i j i j i i
j
z p b c i nρ
=











	   	   	   	   (SRNC)	  
Sequential	  rationality	  ensures	  that	  the	  principal	  will	  only	  implement	  Stage	  2	  projects	  with	  non-­‐negative	  
continuation	  values,	   regardless	  of	   the	   reported	  Stage	  1	   cost	   (SRNC).	   The	   (TTNC)	   constraints	  ensure	   that	  
the	  manager’s	  report	  is	  truthful.	  The	  (IRNC)	  constraints	  assure	  that	  the	  manager	  is	  given	  sufficient	  funds	  
to	  conduct	  his	  Stage	  1	  research.	  Note	  that	  the	  delayed	  slack	  consumption	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  the	  principal’s	  
Stage	   2	   implementation	   decision	   because	   she	   cannot	   recoup	   any	   of	   the	   unconsumed	   budget	   if	   she	  
abandons	  the	  project	  at	  Stage	  2.	  Delayed	  slack	  consumption	  only	  shows	  up	  in	  the	  manager’s	  (TTNC)	  con-­‐
straints.	  
Lemma	  1:	  The	  optimal	  funding	  and	  implementation	  rules	  in	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  benchmark:	  
(i) Define	  a	   Stage	  1	  hurdle	   cost,	   NChc ,	  with	   { }1,...,
NCh n∈ ,	   such	   that	  projects	   are	  always	  
funded	  ( 1iz = )	  when	  the	  Stage	  1	  cost	   is	   less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  hurdle	   NCi hc c≤ ,	  and	  
are	  always	  rejected	  ( 0iz = )	  when	  the	  Stage	  1	  cost	  exceeds	  the	  hurdle,	   NCi hc c> .	  
(ii) Provides	   the	  manager	  with	  a	   fixed	  Stage	  1	  budget:	   NCNCi hb c= ,	   for	  any	   funded	  Stage	  1	  
cost,	   NCi hc c≤ .	  
Note	   that	   the	   structure	  of	   the	  optimal	   Stage	  1	   funding	   rule	   is	   the	   same	  as	   in	   the	  Antle-­‐Eppen	   (1985)	  
model,	   because	   the	   sequential	   rationality	   of	   the	   Stage	   2	   implementation	   decision	  makes	   the	   Stage	   1	  
funding	  decision	  essentially	  a	  one-­‐period	  problem.	  Comparing	  our	  results	  with	  those	  obtained	  in	  the	  No-­‐
Commitment	  model	  will	  thus	  allow	  us	  to	  compare	  our	  results	  with	  the	  prior	  literature	  and	  to	  isolate	  the	  
roles	  of	  delayed	  slack	  consumption	  and	  commitment	  in	  the	  optimal	  capital	  allocation	  rule.	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V. Commitment	  Model	  Results	  
Returning	   to	   our	  Commitment	  model,	   and	   again	   invoking	   the	  Revelation	   Principle,	   the	  manager’s	   ex-­‐
pected	  utility	  upon	  observing	  Stage	  1	  cost	   ic 	  is	  given	  by:	  
	   ( ),
1
k
A i j i j i i
j
U z p b cρ
=
= −∑ .	  
When	  the	  manager	  reports	   ic ,	  the	  principal	  funds	  the	  project	  in	  the	  amount	   ib ,	  with	  probability	   iz ,	  and	  
commits	  to	  a	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rule,	   ,i jp .	  Thus,	  at	  time	  t=1,	  we	  can	  express	  the	  principal’s	  Com-­‐
mitment	  program	  as:	  
,
1
,, , 1 1
max
i i i j
n k
P i j i j j inb z p i j
U z p g bρ
= =
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ 	  
subject	  to:	  	  




i j i j i i s j s j s i
j j
z p b c z p b c i s nρ ρ
= =
− ≥ − =∑ ∑ K 	   	   (TTC)	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1
0 1, , .
k
i j i j i i
j
z p b c i nρ
=
− ≥ =∑ K 	   	   	   	   (IRC)	  
Note	   that	  because	  the	  principal	  can	  now	  commit	   to	  a	  Stage	  2	   implementation	  rule,	   the	  sequential	   ra-­‐
tionality	   constraints	   from	   the	  No-­‐Commitment	   problem	   can	   be	   dropped.	   The	  manager’s	   Truth-­‐Telling	  
constraints,	  (TTC),	  ensure	  that	  the	  manager	  truthfully	  reports	  his	  cost,	   ic .	  The	  manager’s	  Individual	  Ra-­‐
tionality	  constraints,	  (IRC),	  guarantee	  that	  the	  manager	  receives	  sufficient	  funds	  to	  conduct	  his	  Stage	  1	  
research	  whenever	  the	  principal	  agrees	  to	  fund	  it.10	  Conditional	  on	  a	  Stage	  1	  cost	   ic ,	  the	  manager’s	  ex-­‐
pected	  utility	  only	  depends	  on	  the	  interim	  information,	   jg ,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  affects	  the	  probability	  
of	   implementing	  the	  project	   in	  Stage	  2,	  or	  equivalently,	   the	  probability	  that	  he	  consumes	  his	   informa-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Without	  loss	  of	  generality,	  we	  ignore	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  principal	  compensates	  the	  manager	  when:	  (a)	  the	  
principal	  does	  not	  invest	  in	  the	  research	  stage	  and	  (b)	  the	  principal	  does	  invest	  in	  the	  research	  stage,	  but	  chooses	  
not	   implement	   the	   project.	   The	   proof	   of	   this	   assertion	   is	   relatively	   long	   but	   follows	   from	   the	   assumed	   risk-­‐
neutrality	  of	  the	  manager	  and	  lack	  of	  any	  additional	  agency	  problems.	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tional	  rent.	  With	  commitment,	  the	  principal	  has	  three	  choice	  variables	  to	  control	  the	  manager’s	  incen-­‐
tives:	  the	  set	  of	  cost	  reports	  that	  receive	  Stage	  1	  funding	  (the	  set	  of	   ic 	  for	  which	   0iz > );	  the	  associated	  
budgets	  ( ib );	  and	  the	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rule	  ( ,i jp ).	  Proposition	  1	  below	  characterizes	  the	  princi-­‐
pal’s	  optimal	  funding	  and	  implementation	  rules,	  where	   ,
=1
k
i j i j
j
p pρ≡∑ 	  denotes	  the	  probability	  of	  Stage	  2	  
implementation	  following	  a	  cost	  observation	   ic .	  
	  
Proposition	   1:	   The	   optimal	   funding	   and	   implementation	   rules	   (denoted	   by	   a	   “*”	   superscript)	   of	   the	  
Commitment	  model:	  
(i) Define	  a	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  cost,	   *hc ,	  with	   { }
* 1,...,h n∈ ,	  such	  that	  projects	  are	  always	  fund-­‐
ed	  ( * 1iz = )	  when	  the	  cost	  is	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  hurdle	   *i hc c≤ ,	  and	  are	  always	  re-­‐
jected	  ( * 0iz = )	  when	  the	  cost	  exceeds	  the	  hurdle,	   *i hc c> .	  














= + ∑ ,	  that	  weakly	  increases	  in	  
the	  manager’s	  cost,	   ic .	  
(iii) Define	  a	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  value	  hurdle,	   *
iw
g ,	  for	  every	  funded	  Stage	  1	  cost,	   *i hc c≤ ,	  
such	  that	  projects	  are	  implemented	  for	   *
i
j wg g≥ 	  and	  are	  abandoned	  for	   *ij wg g< .	  
(iv) The	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  value	  hurdle	   *
iw
g 	  is	  weakly	  increasing	  in	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  
cost.	  	  
(v) The	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  probability:	  
a. for	  any	  Stage	  2	  project,	   *,i jp 	  is	  weakly	  decreasing	  in	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  cost,	   ic ,	  
and	  increasing	  in	  the	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  value,	   jg ,	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b. for	  all	  Stage	  2	  projects,	   * *,
=1
k
i j i j
j
p pρ≡∑ ,	  is	  weakly	  decreasing	  in	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  
cost,	   ic .	  
	  
Proposition	  1	  (i)	  finds	  that	  the	  familiar	  Stage	  1	  hurdle-­‐rate	  contracts	  from	  the	  prior	  capital	  budgeting	  lit-­‐
erature	  and	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  model	  remain	  optimal	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  Stage	  2	  commitment	  and	  de-­‐
layed	  slack	  consumption.	  As	   in	  the	  prior	   literature,	  the	  hurdle	   is	  used	  to	  discourage	  the	  manager	  from	  
over-­‐stating	  his	  cost.	  The	  optimal	  funding	  probabilities,	   *iz ,	  also	  follow	  the	  earlier	  models,	   in	  that	  they	  
are	  binary.11	  
Part	  (ii)	  provides	  the	  first	   instance	  of	  how	  our	  assumptions	  of	  delayed	  slack	  consumption	  and	  commit-­‐
ment	   to	   Stage	   2	   implementation	   result	   in	   novel	   capital	   allocation	   rules.	  We	   find	   that	   the	   size	   of	   the	  
manager’s	   Stage	   1	   budget,	   *ib ,	   increases	   in	   his	   cost.	   To	   derive	   the	   optimal	   Stage	   1	   budgets,	   we	   use	  
standard	  techniques	  to	  establish	  that	  only	  the	  adjacent	  upward	  (TTC)	  constraints	  are	  binding	  (preventing	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= + ∑ .	   In	   the	   prior	   litera-­‐
ture	  and	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  model,	  the	  budget	  is	  constant	  for	  all	  funded	  cost	  reports	  and	  equal	  to	  the	  
highest	   funded	   cost,	   i.e.,	   NCNCi hb c= ,	   and	   the	   principal	  mitigates	   the	  manager’s	   informational	   rent	   by	  
choosing	   a	   hurdle	   below	   First-­‐Best,	   NC FBh hc c< .	   In	   contrast,	   the	   optimal	   budgets	   in	   our	   Commitment	  
model	   increase	   in	   the	  manager’s	   cost	   because,	  with	   delayed	   slack	   consumption	   and	   Stage	   2	   commit-­‐
ment,	   the	  manager	   is	   interested	   not	   only	   in	   i ib c− 	   as	   in	   the	  No-­‐Commitment	  model,	   but	   also	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  	  Our	  results	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	   *ib ,	  
*
ip 	  and	  
*
iz 	  in	  Proposition	  1	  are	  “weak”	  due	  to	  the	  discreteness	  of	  our	  densi-­‐
ties.	  	  Our	  results	  would	  be	  “strict”	  if	  we	  assumed	  that	  the	  supports	  of	  Stage	  1	  and	  Stage	  2	  costs	  were	  sufficiently	  
dense.	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probability	  with	  which	  he	  is	  able	  to	  consume	  it	  ( ip ),	  which	  the	  principal	  controls.
12	  Hereafter	  we	  will	  re-­‐
fer	  to	   i ib c− 	  as	  “budgetary	  slack”	  and	  to	   ( )i i ip b c− 	  as	  the	  “informational	  rent”.	  	  
By	   increasing	  the	  manager's	  budget	   in	  his	  cost	   report,	   the	  principal	  achieves	   two	  efficiency	  gains	  over	  
the	  NC	  capital	  budgeting	  setting.	  First,	  for	  a	  given	  Stage	  1	  cost	  hurdle,	   hc ,	  the	  manager’s	  budgetary	  slack	  
is	  less	  than	  in	  the	  NC	  and	  prior	  models	  where	   NCNCi hb c= ,	  
NCi h∀ ≤ .	  This	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  second	  benefit	  
in	  that	  it	  allows	  the	  principal	  to	  increase	  the	  Stage	  1	  funding	  hurdle	  closer	  to	  First-­‐Best	  (see	  Proposition	  
2	  (ii),	  below)	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  Stage	  1	  under-­‐investment.	  However,	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  an	  increasing	  
budget	  is	  that	  it	  provides	  the	  manager	  with	  additional	  incentives	  to	  overstate	  his	  cost.	  To	  mitigate	  this	  
incentive,	  the	  principal	  commits	  to	  a	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rule,	   ,i jp ,	  that	  decreases	  in	  the	  manager’s	  
Stage	  1	  cost	  (Prop	  1	  (v.a)).	  The	  manager’s	  situation	  is	  similar	  to	  an	  auction	  where	  the	  bidder	  trades	  off	  
the	  surplus	  ( i ib c− 	  in	  our	  case)	  were	  he	  to	  win	  with	  a	  bid	   ib ,	  against	  the	  probability	  of	  winning	  with	  that	  
bid	  ( ip ).	  Although	  the	  probability	  of	  “winning”	  an	  auction	  is	  exogenously	  determined	  by	  the	  distribution	  
of	  bidders	  but	  is	  optimally	  chosen	  by	  the	  principal	  in	  our	  setting,	  the	  tradeoffs	  the	  bidder/manager	  face	  
are	  identical.	  
As	  (iii)	  points	  out,	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  follows	  a	  (Stage	  1	  report-­‐contingent)	  hurdle	  policy	  in	  that	  all	  
projects	  with	  a	  continuation	  value	  below	  the	  hurdle,	   *
iw
g ,	  are	  abandoned	  and	  projects	  with	  a	  continua-­‐
tion	  value	  strictly	  greater	  than	  the	  hurdle	  are	  implemented	  with	  probability	  1.	  Because	  of	  the	  assumed	  
discreteness	  of	   jg ,	  projects	  whose	  continuation	  value	  is	  exactly	  the	  hurdle	  may	  be	  implemented	  with	  a	  
probability	  less	  than	  1.	  
To	  further	  isolate	  the	  role	  of	  delayed	  slack	  consumption,	  the	  following	  proposition	  compares	  the	  Stage	  1	  
relative	  efficiency	  between	  our	  model	  and	  both	  the	  First-­‐Best	  and	  No-­‐Commitment	  benchmarks.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Note	  that,	  if	  instead	  the	  manager	  could	  consume	  all	  his	  informational	  rent	  in	  Stage	  1,	  then	  the	  principal	  would	  
optimally	  adopt	  the	  First-­‐Best	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rule	  with	  constant	  pi’s,	  which	  when	  plugged	  into	  the	  above	  
recursive	  equation	  would	  imply	  bi= bi+1,	  consistent	  with	  the	  constant	  budget	  obtained	  in	  the	  extant	  literature	  and	  
the	  No	  Commitment	  benchmark	  of	  Lemma	  1.	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Proposition	  2:	  The	  optimal	  capital	  allocation	  mechanism	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model	  results	  in	  Stage	  1	  
investment	  whereby	  the	  principal:	  
(i) Under-­‐invests	  in	  research	  at	  Stage	  1	  relative	  to	  the	  First-­‐Best	  benchmark.	  
(ii) Under-­‐invests	  less	  in	  research	  at	  Stage	  1	  than	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  benchmark.	  
	  
With	  delayed	  slack	  consumption	  and	  Stage	  2	  commitment,	  the	  optimal	  allocation	  involves	  capital	  ration-­‐
ing	  at	  Stage	  1	  ( * FBh h≤ ),	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  previous	  adverse-­‐selection	  models	  of	  capital	  allo-­‐
cation	  (Antle	  and	  Eppen	  1985	  and	  others).	  However,	  Proposition	  2	  (ii)	  finds	  that	  this	  under-­‐investment	  is	  
less	  severe	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model	  than	  in	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  model.	  To	  see	  why,	  suppose	  that:	  (1)	  
there	  are	  three	  Stage	  1	  cost	  realizations	  ( 1c ,	   2c ,	   3c );	  (2)	  all	  Stage	  2	  projects	  have	  non-­‐negative	  continua-­‐
tion	  values;	  (3)	  the	  principal	  funds	  all	  three	  Stage	  1	  managers	  and	  implements	  all	  Stage	  2	  projects	  under	  
First-­‐Best;	  (4)	  the	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  for	  both	  the	  Commitment	  and	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  models	  is	   1c ;	  and	  
(5)	   that	   the	  principal	  optimally	   implements	  all	  Stage	  2	  projects	  conditional	  on	   1c 	   in	  both	  settings.	  Be-­‐
cause	  only	   1c 	   is	  funded,	  no	  manager	  earns	  rent.	  Now,	  consider	   increasing	  the	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  to	   2c .	   In	  
the	  No-­‐Commitment	  model,	  the	  principal	  optimally	  continues	  to	  implement	  all	  Stage	  2	  projects	  (now	  for	  
both	   1c 	  and	   2c )	  and	  must	  therefore	  provide	  a	  budget	  of	   2c 	  to	  both	  managers.	  Thus,	  for	  the	  NC	  model,	  
the	  increase	  in	  informational	  rent	  to	  the	   1c 	  manager	  from	  increasing	  the	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  is	   2 1c c δ− = .	  In	  
the	  Commitment	  model,	  the	  principal	  would	  still	  implement	  all	  Stage	  2	  projects	  for	  the	   1c 	  manager,	  but	  
could	  impose	  a	  lower	  implementation	  probability	  for	  the	   2c 	  manager	  (as	  shown	  in	  Proposition	  1).	  This	  
allows	  the	  principal	  to	  pay	  a	  smaller	  informational	  rent	  to	  the	   1c 	  manager	  than	  in	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  
model,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  incurring	  a	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  inefficiency.	  Thus,	  the	  resulting	  net	  cost	  of	  
reducing	  Stage	  1	  under-­‐investment	  may	  be	  less	  with	  commitment	  than	  without.	  In	  this	  example,	  we	  re-­‐
duced	  the	   1c 	  manager’s	  informational	  rent	  by	  choosing	  an	  implementation	  probability	  for	  the	   2c 	  man-­‐
ager	   less	   than	  1,	   thereby	   incurring	  Stage	  2	  under-­‐investment.	  Alternatively,	   if	   there	  were	  Stage	  2	  pro-­‐
jects	  with	  negative	  continuation	  values,	  then	  instead	  of	   imposing	  an	  inefficient	   implementation	  sched-­‐
ule	  on	  manager	   2c ,	  we	  could	  have	   limited	   the	   1c 	  manager’s	  misreporting	   incentives	  by	   increasing	  his	  
implementation	  probability	  for	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  negative	  continuation	  value	  projects,	  thereby	  incur-­‐
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ring	  Stage	  2	  over-­‐investment.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  show	  in	  Proposition	  3,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  optimal	  Stage	  2	  dis-­‐
tortions	  may	  include	  both	  under-­‐investment	  and	  over-­‐investment.	  	  
	  
Proposition	  3:	  The	  principal’s	  optimal	  contract	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model	  results	  in	  the	  following	  Stage	  
2	  distortions	  relative	  to	  the	  First-­‐Best	  and	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  models:	  
(i) Weak	  under-­‐investment	  on	  average.	  
(ii) Weak	  over-­‐investment	  for	  small	  Stage	  1	  costs.	  
(iii) Weak	  under-­‐investment	  for	  large	  Stage	  1	  costs.	  
	  
Recall	  that	  in	  both	  the	  First-­‐Best	  and	  No-­‐Commitment	  solutions,	  the	  principal’s	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  
rules	  are	  efficient	  in	  that	  they	  ignore	  the	  sunk	  costs	  from	  Stage	  1.13	  However,	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model,	  
the	  principal	  uses	  the	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rules	  to	  trade-­‐off	  her	  project	  profits	  ( jg )	  and	  the	  manag-­‐
er’s	  compensation.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  the	  principal’s	  unconstrained	  optimization	  problem	  after	  substi-­‐
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From	   the	   principal’s	   objective	   function	   it	   is	   straightforward	   that	   the	   more	   Stage	   1	   projects	   that	   are	  
funded,	  the	  more	  slack	  the	  principal	  has	  to	  provide	  the	  managers,	  as	  the	  last	  term	  in	  brackets	  increases	  
in	  h*.	  Furthermore,	  changing	  the	  implementation	  probability	   ,i jp 	  has	  three	  effects	  for	  the	  principal,	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Over-­‐investment	  from	  the	  principal’s	  point	  of	  view	  and	  the	  society’s	  point	  of	  view	  are	  identical	  under	  First-­‐Best.	  
In	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  model	  and	  in	  our	  model,	  over-­‐investment	  from	  the	  principal’s	  point	  of	  view	  occurs	  when	  
any	  project	  with	  a	  negative	  continuation	  value	  is	  implemented.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  over-­‐investment	  from	  a	  social	  
welfare	  point	  of	  view	  because	  the	  loss	  to	  the	  principal	  from	  continuing	  a	  negative	  continuation	  value	  project	  may	  
be	  compensated	  by	  the	  slack	  which	  the	  agent	  gains	  from	  such	  implementation.	  We	  define	  over-­‐investment	  from	  
the	  principal’s	  point	  of	  view.	  Note	  that	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  what	  empiricists	  are	  able	  to	  document,	  as	  the	  slack	  
arising	  from	  earlier	  stage	  investments	  cannot	  be	  observed.	  We	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  raising	  this	  issue.	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direct	  and	  two	  indirect.	  These	  three	  effect	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  principal’s	  marginal	  payoff	  to	  raising	  the	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∑ ∑ .	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
By	  changing	   ,i jp ,	  the	  principal	  changes	  the	  probability	  with	  which	  she	  implements	  a	  project	  with	  con-­‐
tinuation	  value	   jg .	   For	  a	  positive	   continuation	  value,	   increasing	   ,i jp 	   directly	   increases	   the	  principal’s	  
utility	  by	  reducing	  the	  level	  of	  Stage	  2	  under-­‐investment.	  The	  two	  indirect	  effects	  change	  the	  principal’s	  











− = ∑ 	  required	  to	  satisfy	  the	  manager’s	  truth-­‐telling	  











∑ ,	  represents	  the	  amount	  of	  manager	   i ’s	  budget-­‐
ary	  slack	  that	  the	  principal	  can	  reduce	  via	  a	  marginal	   increase	   in	   ,i jp ,	  while	   leaving	  the	  manager’s	  re-­‐








− ∑ ,	   represents	  a	  second,	  counter-­‐
vailing	   indirect	  effect.	   In	  equilibrium	   the	  upward	   truth-­‐telling	   conditions	  are	  binding.	  This	   implies	   that	  
when	  increasing	  the	  probability	  of	  implementation	  for	  manager	   ic ,	  the	  principal	  must	  also	  increase	  the	  
informational	  rents	  paid	  to	  for	  all	  managers	  whose	  cost	  is	  less	  than	   ic .	  That	  is,	  by	  increasing	  the	  imple-­‐
mentation	   probability	   for	   one	  manager,	   the	   payoff	   to	   over-­‐reporting	   increases	   for	   all	  managers	  with	  
lower	  Stage	  1	  cost,	  therefore	  the	  principal	  must	  also	  increase	  the	  rents	  paid	  to	  them	  to	  maintain	  their	  
truth-­‐telling	  incentives.	  
Taking	  these	  three	  effects	  together	  illustrates	  how	  the	  optimal	  allocation	  rule	  may	  result	  in	  Stage	  2	  over-­‐
investment	  for	  relatively	  low	  Stage	  1	  cost	  realizations	  and	  under-­‐investment	  for	  relatively	  high	  Stage	  1	  
cost	  realizations.	  For	  example,	  because	  there	  are	  no	  managers	  with	  a	  lower	  Stage	  1	  cost	  than	  manager	  
1c ,	  the	  second	  indirect	  effect	  is	  absent.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  FOC	  for	  manager	   1c 	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  first	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∑ 	  can	  be	  positive,	  resulting	  in	  
1, 0jp > 	   –	  even	  when	   0jg < .	   Similarly,	   for	  manager	   hc 	   there	  are	  no	  managers	  with	  a	  higher	  Stage	  1	  
cost,	  hence,	  the	  first	  indirect	  effect	  is	  absent.	  This	  FOC	  shows	  how	  the	  second	  indirect	  effect	  can	  lead	  to	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∑ 	   can	   be	   negative,	   resulting	   in	   , 0h jp = 	   –	   even	  when	  
0jg > .	   Proposition	   3	   (i)	   shows	   that	   on	   average,	   the	   effect	   of	   increasing	   the	   slack	   of	   other	  managers	  
dominates	  the	  effect	  of	  reducing	  the	  slack	  of	  any	  one	  manager	  so	  that	  the	  principal	  commits	  to	  under-­‐
investment	  at	  Stage	  2.	  Notice	  however	  that	  if	  either	  the	  principal	  could	  not	  commit	  to	  her	  Stage	  2	  im-­‐









,	   in	  which	  case	   there	  would	  be	  no	   indirect	  effects	  at	  Stage	  2	  and	   the	  principal	  would	   in-­‐
stead	   follow	   the	   sequential	   rational	   implementation	   rule	   used	   both	   in	   the	   First-­‐Best	   and	   No-­‐











Recall	  that	   in	  our	  model	  there	  is	  a	  deadweight	   loss	  from	  abandonment.	  The	  first	   indirect	  effect,	  which	  
gives	  rise	  to	  over-­‐investment,	   is	  entirely	  caused	  by	  this	  deadweight	   loss.	  To	  see	  this	   formally,	  suppose	  
the	  principal	  could	  recoup	  the	  budgetary	  slack	   i ib c− 	  if	  she	  abandons	  the	  project.	  The	  objective	  function	  
then	   becomes	   ( )( )
,
1
,, , 1 1
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∑ ,	  precluding	  over-­‐investment.	  
To	  further	  show	  how	  the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects	  discussed	  above	  interact,	  we	  next	  consider	  the	  ef-­‐
fect	  of	  an	  exogenous	  shock	  to	  a	  single	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  value	   jg 	  on	  the	  implementation	  probabili-­‐





∂ 	  illustrates	  the	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  optimal	   ,i jp 	  
of	  a	  change	   in	   the	  continuation	  value	   jg .	  However,	   in	  equilibrium,	  varying	   ,i jp 	  affects	   the	  budgetary	  
slack	   i ib c− 	  and	  consequently	  the	  manager’s	  (TT
C)	  constraints.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  change	  in	  any	  one	   jg 	  may	  
have	  an	  indirect	  effect	  on	  all	  implementation	  probabilities.	  This	  comparative	  static	  analysis	  is	  illustrated	  
in	  the	  following	  proposition.	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Proposition	   4:	   For	   a	   fixed	   *h ,	   increases	   (decreases)	   in	   a	   continuation	   value,	   jg 	   to	   'jg 	   such	   that	  
1 1'j j jg g g+ −< < ,	   will	   result	   in	   larger	   (smaller)	   optimal	   implementation	   probabilities,	  
* 'ip ,	   relative	   to	  
*,ip 	  for	  all	  
*i h≤ .	  
	  
Increasing	  the	  continuation	  value	   jg 	  to	   'jg 	  changes	  the	  principal’s	  Stage	  2	  expected	  payoff	  whenever	  
*
i
j wg g≥ ,	  i.e.,	  whenever	  the	  manager	  observes	  a	  cost	   ic 	  for	  which	  this	  specific	  Stage	  2	  project	  is	  actual-­‐
ly	   implemented.	  To	  capitalize	  on	  the	  increased	  continuation	  value,	   intuition	  suggests	  that	  the	  principal	  
should	  weakly	  increase	   ,i jp ,	  which	  has	  two	  indirect	  effects.	  To	  illustrate	  these	  two	  effects	  consider	  the	  
following	  example.	  Assume	  there	  are	  three	  potential	  Stage	  1	  costs,	   1c ,	   2c 	  and	   3c 	  as	  well	  as	  four	  poten-­‐
tial	  Stage	  2	  continuation	  values	   1g ,	   2g ,	   3g 	  and	   4g .	  Further	  assume	  that	  the	  optimal	   ,i jp ’s	  are	  repre-­‐
sented	  in	  the	  following	  table.	  
	   1g 	   2g 	   3g 	   4g 	  
1c 	   1,1 1p = 	   1,2 1p = 	   1,3 1p = 	   1,4 0p = 	  
2c 	   2,1 1p = 	   2,2 1p = 	   2,3 0p = 	   2,4 0p = 	  
3c 	   3,1 1p = 	   3,2 0p = 	   3,3 0p = 	   3,4 0p = 	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Implementation	  probabilities	  in	  an	  example	  
Now	  assume	  that	   3g 	  increases	  to	   3 'g .	  This	  makes	  increasing	   2,3p 	  worthwhile	  to	  the	  principal	  due	  to	  the	  
direct	   effect.	   However,	   increasing	   2,3p 	   now	  makes	   it	  more	   valuable	   for	  manager	   1c 	   to	  misrepresent	  
himself	  as	  a	   2c 	  manager.	  To	  maintain	  manager	   1c ’s	  truth-­‐telling	  incentive,	  the	  principal	  weakly	  increas-­‐
es	   1,4p 	   (as	   long	  as	   4g 	   is	  not	  too	  negative).
14	   In	  addition,	   increasing	   2,3p 	  relaxes	  the	  upward	  (TT
C)	  con-­‐
straint	  for	  manager	   2c ,	  which	  the	  principal	  exploits	  by	  weakly	   increasing	   3,2p .	  Therefore,	  the	  principal	  
weakly	  increases	  all	   ,i jp ’s	  following	  the	  increase	  in	   3g .	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  If	   3 0g > 	  and	   4 0g < ,	  then	  this	  change	  results	  in	  optimal	  over-­‐investment	  for	   1c .	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VI. Conclusion	  
Capital	   investment	  decisions	  often	   involve	  multiple	   stages.	   Such	   investments	  are	  particularly	  prone	   to	  
problems	  of	  adverse	  selection,	  because	  the	  firm	  must	  initially	  rely	  on	  managers	  with	  relevant	  prior	  ex-­‐
perience	  or	  expertise.	  These	  informed	  managers	  thus	  stand	  to	  collect	  informational	  rents.	  We	  highlight	  
the	  role	  that	  abandonment	  options	  and	  the	  delayed	  consumption	  of	  slack	  have	  on	  the	  optimal	  design	  of	  
capital	  allocation	  schemes.	  These	  features	  result	  in	  an	  optimal	  allocation	  scheme	  that	  has	  several	  inter-­‐
esting	  features.	  First,	  the	  budgets	  allocated	  at	  Stage	  1	  increase	  in	  the	  manager’s	  cost	  report,	  unlike	  the	  
previous	   literature.	   Second,	  while	  we	   find	  a	   single	   Stage	  1	  hurdle	   rate	   that	  exceeds	   the	   firm’s	   cost	  of	  
capital,	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  literature,	  we	  find	  that	  Stage	  2	  optimally	  exhibits	  multiple	  hurdle	  rates	  (some	  
above	  and	  some	  below	  the	  firm’s	  cost	  of	  capital)	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  cost	  report	  and	  
the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Stage	  1	  research.	  The	  multiple	  hurdle	  rates	  in	  Stage	  2	  are	  consistent	  with	  findings	  in	  
Poterba	  and	  Summers	  (1995).	  
Our	   model	   makes	   a	   number	   of	   assumptions.	   For	   example,	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   interim	   information	  
available	  at	  Stage	  2	  is	   independent	  of	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  cost.	   If	   instead,	  the	  manager’s	  cost	   infor-­‐
mation	   is	   correlated	   with	   the	   Stage	   2	   continuation	   cost,	   then	   the	   principal	   could	   further	   reduce	   the	  
manager’s	   informational	   rents	   by	   exploiting	   this	   statistical	   relation.	   However,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	  
Stage	  2	  information	  does	  not	  perfectly	  reveal	  the	  manager’s	  cost,	  then	  the	  same	  tensions	  examined	  in	  
this	  study	  would	  continue	  to	  hold.	  	  
Our	  formulation	  also	  assumes	  that	  the	  manager	  only	  derives	  utility	  from	  excessive	  investment	  in	  assets	  
if	  the	  project	  is	   implemented	  in	  Stage	  2	  and	  that	  the	  salvage	  value	  of	  the	  Stage	  1	  investment	  is	  zero	  if	  
the	  project	  is	  abandoned.	  While	  these	  assumptions	  are	  relatively	  strong,	  they	  are	  not	  critical	  to	  our	  re-­‐
sults.	  All	  of	  our	  results	  continue	  to	  hold	  provided	  that	  (1)	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  manager’s	  slack	  consump-­‐
tion	  depends	  on	  the	  project	  implementation	  and	  that	  (2)	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  remaining	  slack	  cannot	  be	  
recouped	  by	  the	  principal	  if	  the	  project	  is	  abandoned.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  our	  find-­‐
ings	  is	  that	  there	  be	  a	  deadweight	  loss	  associated	  with	  the	  Stage	  1	  funding	  (unconsumed	  excess	  assets),	  
and	  that	  the	  deadweight	  loss	  depend	  on	  the	  manager’s	  reported	  cost.	  Thus	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  traditional	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tradeoff	  between	  production	  efficiencies	  and	   informational	   rents,	  our	  principal	   is	  also	  concerned	  with	  
the	  deadweight	  loss	  attributed	  to	  the	  cancelation	  of	  previously	  funded	  projects.15	  
Another	   assumption	   is	   that	  while	   the	  manager	  privately	  observes	   the	   Stage	  1	   cost,	   the	   Stage	  2	   infor-­‐
mation	   is	   publicly	   observed.	  As	   long	   as	   the	  manager	   cannot	   leave	   the	   firm	  after	   having	  observed	   the	  
Stage	  2	  information	  (as	  in	  Pfeiffer	  and	  Schneider	  2007),	  he	  would	  not	  earn	  any	  rents	  on	  that	  private	  in-­‐
formation	   and	   our	   results	   would	   continue	   to	   hold.	   If	   instead	   the	  manager	   could	   leave,	   the	   principal	  
would	  design	  the	  contract	  to	  limit	  the	  additional	  informational	  rents,	  thereby	  introducing	  additional	  dis-­‐
tortions.	  Alternatively,	  if	  the	  principal	  privately	  observes	  the	  continuation	  value,	  her	  ability	  to	  commit	  to	  
a	  multi-­‐stage	  funding	  rule	  would	  be	  limited,	  possibly	  leading	  to	  the	  use	  of	  implicit	  contracts.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Trading	  off	  productive	  efficiency	  and	  deadweight	  loss,	  although	  not	  informational	  rent,	  arises	  in	  the	  implicit	  con-­‐
tracting	  literature	  (e.g.,	  MacLeod	  2003	  and	  Rajan,	  and	  Reichelstein	  2009).	  
Multi-­‐stage	  Capital	  Budgeting	  with	  Delayed	  Consumption	  of	  Slack	   Page	  21	  of	  30	  
VII. Appendix	  
Proofs	  
Proposition	  1:	  	  
(i	  Stage	  1	  hurdle)	  Note	  that	  the	  manager’s	  utility	  does	  not	  depend	  on	   ,i jp 	  per-­‐se,	  but	  only	  on	  the	  total	  
implementation	  probability	   ,
1
k




=∑ ,	  therefore	  in	  evaluating	  the	  manager’s	  expected	  utility,	  it	  suf-­‐
fices	  to	  consider	  the	  total	  implementation	  probabilities,	   ip ,	  instead	  of	  the	  individual	  probabilities,	   ,i jp .	  
Thus,	  we	  can	  write	  the	  expected	  utility	  of	  a	  manager	  who	  observes	  and	  reports	   ic 	  as	   ( )i i i iz p b c− .	  We	  
first	  show	  that	  if	   0i iz p > 	  then	   1i ib b− ≤ ,	  which	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  establish	  that	   { }0,1iz ∈ 	  and	  that	  the	  op-­‐
timal	  contract	  employs	  a	  hurdle	  rule	  for	  Stage	  1	  funding	  decisions.	  
Assuming	   0i iz p > ,	  adding	  the	  (TT
C)	  constraints	  for	   i 	  and	   1i − ,	  yields:	   1 1 1 1( ) ( )i i i i i i i iz p c c z p c c− − − −− ≥ − 	  or	  
1 1i i i iz p z p− −≤ .	  To	  satisfy	  (TT
C)	  for	  i,	  we	  must	  have:	   1 1 1( ) ( )i i i i i i i iz p b c z p b c− − −− ≥ − ,	  
thus ( ) ( )1i i i ib c b c−− ≥ − ,	  or	  equivalently, 1i ib b −≥ .	  	  
Note	  that	  projects	  are	  funded	  in	  Stage	  1	  with	  probability	  1	  or	  0	   { }( )0,1iz ∈ 	  because	  the	  principal’s	  prob-­‐
lem	  is	  linear	  in	   iz .	  
To	  complete	  the	  proof	  to	  Proposition	  1	  (i)	  and	  establish	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  hurdle	  research	  cost,	   hc :	  sup-­‐
pose	  a	  manager	  reporting	   ˆic 	  is	  funded,	  then	   =1iz ,	  implying	   0ip > 	  (otherwise	  the	  allocated	  budget	  is	  
wasted).	  Since	   i iz p 	  was	  shown	  to	  decrease	  in	  i,	  we	  have	   1 1 > 0i iz p− − .	  Therefore	  if	  a	  manager	  receives	  
Stage	  1	  funding,	  all	  managers	  with	  lower	  reported	  costs	  also	  receive	  funding,	  which	  establishes	  the	  ex-­‐
istence	  of	  a	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  rule.	  This	  together	  with	   1 10 i i i iz p z p− −< ≤ 	  implies	  that	   1i ip p −≤ .	  
(ii	  Optimal	  budgets)	  We	  first	  show	  that	  expected	  rents	  are	  strictly	  decreasing	  in	  the	  reported	  cost,	   ˆic .	  
We	  then	  prove	  that	  the	  upward	  (TTC)	  constraints	  must	  bind	  in	  equilibrium,	  which	  enables	  us	  to	  derive	  
the	  optimal	  budgets.	  
From	  (TTC)	  for	  any	   ,i l 	  such	  that	   , > 0i lp p 	  and	   <i lc c 	  we	  have: ( ) ( ) > ( )i i i l l i l l lp b c p b c p b c− ≥ − − .	  That	  
is,	  the	  manager’s	  expected	  rent	  is	  decreasing	  in	  his	  cost	  observation	  if	  (TTC)	  holds.	  If	   hc 	  is	  the	  greatest	  
research	  cost	  observation	  for	  which	   > 0hp ,	  then	  it	  must	  be	  that	   =h hb c ;	  i.e.,	  when	  the	  manager	  truth-­‐
fully	  reports	  the	  largest	  allowable	  research	  cost,	  he	  earns	  no	  expected	  rents.	  If	  not,	  the	  principal	  could	  
increase	  her	  expected	  payoff	  by	  decreasing	  all	   ib 	  for	   i h< 	  by	   0h hb c− > .	  All	  (IR
C)	  constraints	  continue	  
to	  be	  satisfied	  since	  we	  have	  already	  shown	  that	   ( ) ( )> 0h i i i h h hp p b c p b c i h⇒ − ≥ − ∀ < ,	  and	  the	  
(TTC)	  constraints	  are	  unaffected	  since	  all	  budgets	  are	  decreased	  equally.	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We	  next	  show	  that	  only	  the	  adjacent	  upward	  (TTC)	  constraints	  bind	  at	  optimality.	  First,	  it	  is	  straight-­‐
forward	  to	  establish	  that	  satisfying	  the	  adjacent	  upward	  constraints	  implies	  that	  all	  other	  upward	  con-­‐
straints	  are	  satisfied	  provided	  that	  the	  budgets	  are	  monotonic	  (which	  was	  shown	  above).	  In	  addition,	  it	  
is	  also	  straightforward	  to	  show	  that,	  given	  that	  the	   ip ’s	  are	  weakly	  decreasing,	  satisfying	  the	  upward	  
constraints	  implies	  that	  the	  downward	  constraints	  are	  also	  satisfied.	  Accordingly,	  we	  restrict	  our	  atten-­‐
tion	  to	  adjacent	  upward	  constraints.	  If	   0ip > ,	  then	  if	  the	  upward	  adjacent	  (TT
C)	  constraint	  binds	  for	   i ,	  
we	  must	  have	   1 1( ) = ( )i i i i i ip b c p b c+ +− − 	  or	  equivalently,	   1 1
1
= 1i ii i i
i i
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= + ∑ 	  as	  stated	  in	  part	  (ii).	  	  
To	  see	  that	  the	  adjacent	  upward	  (TTC)	  constraints	  must	  bind,	  suppose	  that	  the	  (TTC)	  constraint	  for	  a	  
manager	  truthfully	  reporting	   ic 	  does	  not	  bind;	  i.e., ( ) ( )1 1 0i i i i i ip b c p b c ε+ +− − − = > .	  Consider	  a	  change	  
wherein	  we	  reduce	  the	  budget	  for	  a	  manager	  with	  cost	   ic 	  by	  
ip
εγ = 	  so	  that	  his	  adjacent	  upward	  (TTC)	  
constraint	  now	  binds.	  The	  change	  relaxes	  the	  adjacent	  upward	  (TTC)	  constraint	  of	  a	  manager	  with	   1ic − 	  
but	  leaves	  unchanged	  the	  adjacent	  upward	  (TTC)	  constraints	  of	  all	  other	  managers.	  Since	  all	  the	  upward	  
adjacent	  (TTC)	  constraints	  continue	  to	  hold	  it	  is	  again	  straightforward	  to	  show	  that	  the	  downward	  con-­‐
straints	  continue	  to	  be	  satisfied.	  Further,	  the	  (IRC)	  constraint	  for	  manager	  i+1	  assures	  that	  his	  utility	  is	  at	  
least	  0,	  therefore	   ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 0i i i i i i i i ip b c p b c p b cε + + + + +− − = − > − ≥ ,	  hence	  the	  new	  contract	  continues	  
to	  satisfy	  manager	  i's	  (IRC)	  constraint.	  Finally,	  we	  previously	  showed	  in	  the	  proof	  of	  part	  (i)	  that	   ib is	  
weakly	  increasing	  in	  the	  manager’s	  Stage	  1	  cost	  report.	  
(iii-­‐v)	  
We	  show	  that	  the	  desired	  properties	  of	   ,i jp 	  follow	  from	  the	  first	  order	  conditions	  (FOC).
16	  Using	  the	  op-­‐
timal	  budgets	  from	  part	  (ii),	  we	  can	  express	  the	  principal's	  problem	  as	   ,
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  Since	   j
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δ
	  is	  decreasing	  in	   j ,	  if	   *, 1i jp = ,	  then	  
*
, 1i lp = 	  for	   l j< ,	  that	  is,	  the	  opti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  A	  proof	  that	  the	  first-­‐order	  approach	  yields	  a	  maximum	  is	  available	  from	  the	  authors	  upon	  request.	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mal	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  probabilities	  are	  weakly	  decreasing	  (increasing)	  in	  the	  Stage	  2	  index	  j	  (con-­‐
tinuation	  value	   jg ),	  which	  establishes	  (iii)	  and	  the	  second	  part	  of	  (v.a).	  From	  above,	  we	  know	  that	  
1i ip p −≤ 	  which	  proves	  (iv)	  and	  (v.b)	  and,	  together	  with	  the	  Stage	  2	  hurdle	  rule,	  implies	  that	   ,i jp 	  is	  
weakly	  decreasing	  in	  i,	  which	  proves	  the	  first	  part	  of	  (v.a).	  
	  
Proposition	  2:	  
To	  facilitate	  what	  follows,	  we	  exploit	  the	  result	  that	  the	   ,i jp ’s	  are	  decreasing	  in	   j .	  Therefore,	  if	  for	  any	  
given	  funded	   ic ,	   1ip ρ≤ ,	  the	  principal	  only	  implements	   1g .	  Likewise,	  if	  for	  any	  given	  funded	   ic ,	  
1 1 2ipρ ρ ρ< ≤ + ,	  the	  principal	  only	  implements	   1g 	  and	   2g .	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  express	  the	  principal’s	  
revenues	  associated	  with	  implementing	  a	  Stage	  2	  project	  with	  probability	   ip 	  as	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Define	  the	  principal’s	  utility	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  implementation	  probability	  vector	  
( ) [ ]1, , 0,1 hhP p p= ∈K 	  and	  budget	  vector	   ( )1, , hB b b= K 	  as	   ( ) ( )
=1
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  or	  as	  














= + ∑ .	  
We	  label	  the	  least	  profitable	  (in	  terms	  of	  the	  continuation	  value)	  Stage	  2	  project	  that	  the	  principal	  im-­‐
plements	  with	  positive	  probability	  after	  funding	  a	  manager	  with	  reported	  Stage	  1	  cost	   ic ,	  as iwg ;	  i.e.,	  
, 0i j ip j w> ⇔ ≤ .	  
Part	  (i)	  
We	  first	  show	  that	  over-­‐investment	  relative	  to	  First-­‐Best	  in	  Stage	  1	  is	  never	  optimal.	  	  
Define	   FBh 	  as	  the	  optimal	  Stage	  1	  hurdle	  in	  the	  First-­‐Best	  model	  that	  funds	  all	  managers	  with	  cost	  less	  
than	  or	  equal	  to	   FBhc .	  Fixing	   1
FBh h= + 	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model	  and	  optimizing	  over	  P	  yields	  the	  solu-­‐
tion:
	  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * *1 2 11 1 , 1 ,..., 1FBFB FB FB FBhP h p h p h p h++ = + + + .	  The	  principal's	  expected	  utility	  is	  thus:	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   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
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+ = + − − + ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ .	  
Now,	  consider	  an	  alternative	  allocation	  policy	  where	  the	  principal	  does	  not	  fund	  the	  manager	  with	  re-­‐
ported	  Stage	  1	  cost	   1FBhc + ,	  but	  retains	  the	  all	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	   ( )* 1FBP h + 	  policy.	  For	  this	  alternative	  
policy	  the	  principal's	  expected	  utility	  is	  given	  by	  (note	  the	   FBh 	  superscript	  on	  U )	  
	  









h FB FB FB
i i sFB
i s ii





⎜ ⎟+ = + − − +
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∑ ∑ .	  	  
The	  marginal	  benefit	  attributed	  to	  the	  decreased	  number	  of	  funded	  projects	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model	  
is	  given	  by:17	  
	  
( ) ( )
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1 * * * *
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∑
	  
Since	  the	  optimal	  First-­‐Best	  hurdle	  (Stage	  1)	  cost	   FBc 	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  largest	   ic 	  such	  that	  
( )( )max 0p ip cγ − ≥ ,	  it	  follows	  that	   ( )* 1 1 0FB FBh hp cγ + +− < ,	  hence	  the	  differ-­‐
ence ( )( ) ( )( )* 1 *1 1FB FBh FB h FBU P h U P h++ − + 	  is	  positive	  and	  the	  principal	  never	  over-­‐invests	  in	  Stage	  1	  
relative	  to	  First-­‐Best.	  	  
Next	  we	  show	  the	  possibility	  of	  under-­‐investment.	  	  
Assume	  that	  under	  First-­‐Best	   FBh 	  managers	  receive	  Stage	  1	  funding.	  Now	  consider	  the	  principal’s	  solu-­‐
tion	  to	  the	  Commitment	  model	  assuming	  that	  the	  same	   FBh 	  managers	  receive	  funding	  in	  Stage	  





P h p p p= ∈K .	  Let	   ( ) [ ]1( ) , , 0,1 FBFB hFB FB FB FBhP h p p= ∈K 	  denote	  the	  First-­‐Best	  solu-­‐
tion	  and	   ( )( )FBh FB FBFBU P h 	  the	  principal’s	  expected	  utility	  under	  First-­‐Best	  employing	   FBh 	  and	   ( )FB FBP h .	  
By	  definition,	   ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( ) 0FB FBh FB FB h FB FBFB FBU P h U P h− − < .	  Comparing	  the	  FOC	  for	  the	  First-­‐Best	  and	  Com-­‐
mitment	  models	  shows	  that	   ( )*FB FBFB FBh hp h p≤ ,	  hence	   ( )( ) ( )*FB FB FB FBFB FBh h h hp h c p cγ γ− ≤ − ,	  implying:	  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 * *( ) ( ) ( )FB FB FB FBh FB h FB FB h FB h FBFB FBU P FB U P h U P h U P h− −− ≤ − .	  Thus,	  the	  cost	  of	  under-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  We	  omit	  the	   ( )1FBh + 	  notation	  below	  as	  all	  implementation	  probabilities	  below	  are	  from	   ( )* 1FBP h + .	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investment	  at	  Stage	  1	  is	  always	  greater	  in	  the	  First-­‐Best	  setting	  relative	  to	  that	  in	  the	  Commitment	  set-­‐
ting,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  principal	  weakly	  under-­‐invests	  at	  Stage	  1	  in	  the	  model	  with	  Commitment.	  
	  
Part	  (ii)	  
We	  next	  prove	  that	  Stage	  1	  under-­‐investment	  is	  mitigated	  with	  the	  Commitment	  model	  relative	  to	  the	  
No-­‐Commitment	  model.	  In	  the	  Commitment	  case,	  the	  principal	  solves:	   ,1 max ( , )
h
P BU P Bn 	  
subject	  to	  
(IRC)	  and	  (TTC).	  Let	  { }* *( ), ( )P h B h 	  denote	  the	  principal's	  solution	  to	  the	  Commitment	  model	  with	  h	  
managers	  receiving	  Stage	  1	  funding.	  Similarly,	  the	  No-­‐Commitment	  (NC)	  solution	  can	  be	  specified	  as	  
{ }( ), ( )NC NCP h B h 	  with	   ( ) ( ), ,NC h hB h c c= K .	  The	  NC	  model	  assumes	  that	  the	  principal	  cannot	  commit	  to	  
a	  Stage	  2	  implementation	  rule	  and	  therefore	  acts	  sequentially	  rationally;	  consequently,	  
( ) ( )=NC NCip h p h 	  for	  all	   i h≤ .	  The	  total	  expected	  profit	  in	  the	  NC	  model	  given	  a	  Stage	  1	  cost	  hurdle,	   hc ,	  
is	  therefore	  given	  by	   ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ), =h NC NC NC hhU P h B h p h ch γ − .	  To	  establish	  the	  result,	  we	  will	  show	  
that	  the	  incremental	  profit	  of	  funding	  a	  manager	  with	  cost	   1hc + 	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model	  is	  weakly	  
greater	  than	  the	  incremental	  profit	  obtained	  in	  the	  NC	  setting.	  That	  is,	  we	  will	  show	  that:	  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 * * * * 11 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,h h h NC NC h NC NCU P h B h U P h B h U P h B h U P h B h+ ++ + − ≥ + + − .	  	  
The	  proof	  is	  by	  construction.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  begin	  with	  the	  solution	   ( ) ( )( )* *,P h B h ,	  and	  use	  it	  to	  gener-­‐
ate	  a	  feasible	   ( ) ( )( )1 , 1P h B h+ + 	  contract	  to	  the	  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )1
1 , 1
max 1 , 1h
P h B h
U P h B h+
+ +
+ + 	  problem,	  such	  that	  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 * * 11 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,h h h NC NC h NC NCU P h B h U P h B h U P h B h U P h B h+ ++ + − ≥ + + − .	  The	  ap-­‐
proach	  is	  sufficient,	  because	   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 * * 1( 1 , 1 ) 1 , 1h hU P h B h U P h B h+ ++ + ≥ + + 	  by	  definition.	  	  
First	  note	  that	  adding	  an	  additional	  manager	  in	  the	  NC	  model	  yields	  incremental	  profit	  to	  the	  principal	  of	  	  
	   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 111 , 1 , =h NC NC h NC NC NC hU P h B h U P h B h p c hn γ δ+ ++ + − − − ,	  	  
as	  all	  managers	  with	  cost	   1i hc c +< 	  now	  earn	  an	  additional	  rent	  of	  δ 	  dollars.	  	  
Let	   s 	  denote	  the	  smallest	  index,	  such	  that	  
*NC
sp p≥ 	  (the	  existence	  of	   s 	  is	  guaranteed	  by	  Proposition	  4).	  
Define	  the	  proposed	  probability	  vector	   ( )1P h + 	  as	   ( ) ( )* * * *1 11 = , , , , , ,NCs s hP h p p p p p−+ K K 	  and	  the	  proposed	  

















+ + + ⎟⎜
⎝ ⎠
∑ K .	  The	  proposed	  probability	  vector	  for	  
1h + 	  managers	  begins	  with	  the	  original	  solution	  for	  h 	  managers,	  and	  changes	  the	  implementation	  proba-­‐
bility	  for	  all	  managers	  with	  cost	   i sc c≥ .	  For	   i sc c= ,	  the	  proposed	  implementation	  probability	  is	  
NCp 	  
Multi-­‐stage	  Capital	  Budgeting	  with	  Delayed	  Consumption	  of	  Slack	   Page	  26	  of	  30	  
( NCsp p= )	  and	  for	   i sc c> ,	  the	  proposed	  implementation	  probability	  is	  the	  same	  probability	  as	  for	  manager	  
1ic − 	  in	  the	  original	  solution	  (
*
1i ip p −= 	  for	   i s> ).	  Therefore	  one	  interpretation	  for	  the	  proposed	  probability	  
vector	  is	  that	  the	  additional	  manager	  was	  “inserted”	  between	  managers	   1sc − 	  and	   sc 	  in	  the	  original	  solution	  
vector.	  For	  example,	  if	   = 0.7NCp ,	   4h = 	  and	   ( )
* ={.9,.8,.5,.4}P h ,	  then	   = 3s ,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  proposed	  
probability	  vector	  is	  given	  by	   ( )1 ={.9,.8,.7,.5,.4}P h + .	  Alternatively,	  if	   = .95NCp ,	  then	   1s = ,	  in	  which	  case	  
the	  proposed	  probability	  vector	  is	  given	  by	   ( )1 ={.95,.9,.8,.5,.4}P h + .	  Note	  that	  our	  proposed	  probability	  
vector	  increases	  the	  overall	  likelihood	  of	  project	  implementation	  by	   1 NCpn 	  over	  the	  prior	  solution,	   ( )
*P h ,	  
which	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  NC	  setting.	  Because	  all	  Stage	  1	  cost	  observations	  are	  equally	  likely,	  the	  expected	  
incremental	  revenue	  only	  varies	  with	  the	  overall	  likelihood	  of	  project	  implementation;	  therefore	  the	  incre-­‐
mental	  revenue	  associated	  with	   ( )1P h + 	  is	  identical	  to	  that	  incurred	  in	  the	  NC	  setting:	   1 ( )NCn pγ .18	  The	  
proposed	  budget	  vector,	   ( )1B h + ,	  was	  chosen	  according	  to	  the	  optimal	  budget	  allocation	  outlined	  in	  Prop-­‐
osition	  1,	  therefore	   ( ) ( ){ }1 , 1P h B h+ + 	  satisfies	  the	  (TTC)	  and	  (IRC)	  constraints	  for	  all	  managers.	  	  
To	  complete	  the	  proof,	  we	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  incremental	  cost	  of	  funding	  an	  additional	  manager	  in	  the	  
NC	  setting,	   ( )11 hc hn δ+ + ,	  provides	  an	  upper-­‐bound	  for	  the	  incremental	  cost	  incurred	  in	  our	  proposed	  solu-­‐
tion	  to	  the	  Commitment	  problem.	  By	  replacing	  the	   h 	  manager	  optimal	  contract	   ( ) ( ){ }* *,P h B h 	  with	  the	  
proposed	   1h + 	  manager	  contract	  in	  the	  Commitment	  setting,	   ( ) ( ){ }1 , 1P h B h+ +
	  
,	  the	  principal	  incurs	  an	  
incremental	  cost	  of:	  





1 1 1 1 .
h h s h
s
i i i i i i
i i i i s
bb b b b b b
n n n n n
+ −
+
= = = =
− = − + − +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 	   (A.1)	  
As	  the	  budgets	  always	  provide	  a	  manager	  with	  cost	   ic 	  with	  his	  true	  cost	   ic plus	  slack,	  the	  above	  difference	  
is	  given	  by	  the	  difference	  in	  slack	  for	  the	  pre-­‐existing	   h 	  managers,	  plus	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  newly	  funded	  manag-­‐
er,	   11 hcn + .	  Therefore	  we	  can	  rewrite	  the	  incremental	  cost,	  (A.1),	  as:	  
	  
* *1 1 1 1
1 * *
1 = 1 = 1 = 2 = 1 = 1
11 .
s h h h h h h
q q q q q
h NC
i q i q i i s q i q i q si i i i
p p p p p
cn n p p n p p n p
δ δ δ
− + + +
+
= + + = + + +
⎞ ⎞⎛ ⎛
+ − + − +⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎝⎠ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 	   (A.2)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Our	  assumption	  of	  discrete,	  rather	  than	  continuous,	  costs	  simplifies	  the	  search	  for, s ,	  the	  smallest	  index,	  such	  
that	   *NC sp p≥ .	  Further,	  our	  assumption	  of	  uniformly	  distributed	  costs	  simplifies	  the	  construction	  of	  an	   1h + 	  
probability	  vector,	   ( )1P h + ,	  which	  attains	  the	  same	  incremental	  revenues	  as	  the	  NC	  model.	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The	  fact	  that	  the	  proposed	  probability	  vector,	   ( )1P h + ,	  uses	  the	  same	  implementation	  probabilities	  as	  
( )*P h ,	   ( )*ip ,	  for	  managers	  with	  cost	   i sc c< ,	  uses	   NCsp p= ,	  and	   * 1i ip p −= 	  for	  managers	  with	  cost	   i sc c> 	  
allows	  us	  to	  express	  the	  incremental	  cost,	  (A.2),	  as:	  
	  
* * * * *1 1 1
1 * * * * *
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∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
	  
By	  construction,	   NCip p> 	  for	   i s< ,	  and	  
NC
ip p< 	  for	   i s> ,	  therefore	  we	  have	  derived	  an	  upper	  bound	  for	  
the	  incremental	  cost	  associated	  with	   ( ) ( ){ }1 , 1P h B h+ + 	  in	  the	  Commitment	  model,	  namely	   11 h hcn nδ+ + ,	  
which	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  incremental	  cost	  in	  the	  NC	  model.	  
	  
Proposition	  3:	  
(i	  weak	  over-­‐investment	  for	  1)	  To	  prove	  part	  (i),	  note	  that	  if	   1 0p > ,	  then	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∑ ,	  which	  implies	   ( )*1' pγ 	  can	  be	  negative,	  even	  though	  at	  the	  











i j≠ ,	  the	  principal	  weakly	  over-­‐invests	  in	  the	  Commitment	  setting	  relative	  to	  the	  First-­‐Best	  setting.	  If	  
0kg ≥ ,	  over-­‐investment	  is	  impossible	  therefore	  this	  is	  a	  mute	  point.	  Since	  the	  probabilities,	   *ip ,	  are	  or-­‐
dered,	  if	  over-­‐investment	  takes	  place	  for	  the	  manager	  with	  the	  lowest	  reported	  cost,	  then	  the	  principal	  
may	  also	  over-­‐invest	  for	  managers	  with	  greater	  reported	  costs.	  	  
To	  prove	  (ii	  under-­‐invest	  for	  h);	  note	  that	  if	   0hp > ,	  then	  the	  FOC	  with	  respect	  to	   hp 	  is:	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≥ >∑ ;	  i.e.,	  weak	  under-­‐
investment	  relative	  to	  First-­‐Best	  when	  the	  manager	  reports	  sufficiently	  large	  cost	  realizations.	  	  
To	  prove	  part	  (iii	  on	  average	  under):	  the	  FOC	  with	  respect	  to	   ip 	  for	   0ip > 	  
is:















⎞⎛∂ − + ⎟⎜= ≥
⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ .	  Summing	  over	  all	  FOC,	  substituting	   ( )* ii wp gγ ′ = 	  
and	  multiplying	  by	  n,	  yields: ( )
( )
*














∑ ∑ ∑ .	  Since	   pi* 	  is	  weakly	  decreasing	  in	   i ,	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≥∑ ,	  and	  hence	  on	  average,	  there	  is	  weak	  under-­‐










It	  suffices	  to	  show	  that	  the	  principal's	  objective	  function,	   ( )hU P ,	  is	  super-­‐modular	  and	  exhibits	  increas-­‐






∂ ∂ 	  
with	  






















δ∂ =∂ ∂ when	   j > i ,	  we	  conclude	  that	  








∂ = >∂ ∂ ,	  the	  function	  
hU 	  is	  super-­‐modular	  over	  the	  sub-­‐
lattice ( ){ } ( ){ }1 2 1 1 2 1, , , : < ,0 1 , , , : <h i i i k i ip p p p p p g g g g g+ +< ≤ ×K K ,	  as	  was	  to	  be	  shown.	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